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THE RULE OF LIABILITY FOR Loss OF USE WHEN
PROPERTY Is TOTALLY DESTROYED: SOME ECONOMIC
CONSIDERATIONS

Louis DE ALESSI*
In this article Professor De Alessi applies economic analysis
to a Californiacase which held that a tortfeasor who negligently
destroys property which he rented is liable to the lessor for loss
of use during the time in which a replacement is being procured.
In arriving at the conclusion that the court may have made the
correct decision despite the lack of economic considerations, a
framework for economic analysis is suggested which may well be
extendable to other factual situations.
I.

INTRODUCTION

II.
III.
IV .

..........................................................

T HE FACTS .............................................................
ECONOMIC A NALYSIS .....................................................
CONCLUSION ............................................................

I.

255
256
258
265

INTRODUCTION

Both lawyers and economists have been interested in exploring
the economic consequences of alternative rules of liability ever since
Professor Coase, in a landmark essay, showed how economic theory
could be used to provide significant insights into this problem.'
Although the subsequent literature has been relatively extensive
and unusually good,2 much remains to be done both at the theoretical level by clarifying some of the finer points involved, and at the
practical level by applying the analysis to particular classes of cases.
This article examines a change in the California rule of liability
for loss of use when property is totally destroyed. In Reynolds v.
* Professor of Economics, Law and Economics Center, School of Law, University of
Miami. B.A. 1954, M.A. 1955, Ph.D. 1961, University of California, Los Angeles. The author
gratefully acknowledges research assistance by Jeffrey Weinman and helpful comments by
Kenneth W. Clarkson, Donald'L. Martin, James S. Mofsky, and Warren F. Schwartz.
1. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAw & ECON. 1 (1960).
2. See G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970);

McKean, Products Liability: Trends and Implications, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 3 (1970); Oi, The
Economics of Product Safety, 4 BElL J. ECON. & MANAG. Sm. 3 (1973).
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Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association,3 the Supreme Court of California agreed with plaintiff that precluding recovery for loss of use during the period reasonably required for replacement when personal property was totally destroyed was unfair
and inconsistent. It was unfair because the owner of the wrongfully
destroyed property was made to bear the cost of the loss, and it was
inconsistent because other state rules allowed recovery under apparently similar circumstances. Economic considerations, however,
suggest that the questions of fairness and consistency at best were
handled superficially.
The decision is particularly interesting because it appears that
the rule is gaining broad support. The federal government and numerous states are in accord with Reynolds.4 Moreover, the theoretical considerations at issue are equally applicable to other classes of
cases involving a change in the rule of liability.
Section II contains a brief summary of the facts and of the
findings in Reynolds. Section III presents an economic analysis of
pertinent issues which would have been helpful in the disposition
of this and similar cases. Section IV contains a few concluding remarks.
I.

THE FACTS

On November 12, 1955, in California, Wesley Reynolds rented
a small airplane to Robert Duncan. On November 13 Duncan negligently ditched the plane in the Pacific Ocean. The plane was totally
destroyed, and Duncan lost his life. Reynolds then brought suit
against the Bank of America, the executor of Duncan's estate. The
case was tried in the Superior Court of San Mateo County before a
jury and resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of
$30,000, the purchase price of a new plane. In the course of the trial,
Reynolds unsuccessfully sought to introduce evidence regarding loss
of use or loss of profits during the time lag (allegedly a minimum of
four months) involved in obtaining a replacement plane of similar
make.
Reynolds appealed from the portion of the judgment denying
recovery for loss of use. The district court of appeals reversed with
an instruction to retry the issue of damages for loss of use.5 Defendant requested a rehearing. When that was denied, he obtained a
3. 53 Cal. 2d 49, 345 P.2d 926 (1959).
4. For an index of the jurisdictions which have accepted the rule, see Annot. 18 A.L.R.
3d 497 (1968).

5. 335 P.2d 741 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
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hearing before the Supreme Court of California.
The primary issue before the supreme court was clear: should
the owner of personal property which has been wrongfully destroyed
be limited in damages to the value of the property at the time of
destruction, or should recovery include the loss of use or profit foregone during the period.reasonably required for the replacement?'
Prior to Reynolds, the rule in California was that loss of use
(presumably the wealth foregone) was not recoverable when personal property was totally destroyed.7 Section 3333 of the California
Civil Code, however, provided: "For the breach of an obligation not
arising from contract, the measure of damages, except where otherwise expressly provided by this Code, is the amount which will
compensate for all the detriment proximately caused thereby,
whether it could have been anticipated or not."' Under section 3333,
the owner of a motor vehicle damaged by the wrongful action of
another person was found to be entitled to recover for the damage
to the vehicle and for the loss of use during the period reasonably
required to repair it.'
Predictably, plaintiff argued that the rule precluding recovery
for loss of use was unfair and that it was inconsistent with other
rules pertaining to loss of use. Defendant argued that prior cases
supported his position.
Chief Justice Gibson, writing for the Supreme Court of California reasoned:
There appears to be no logical or practical reason why a distinction should be drawn between cases in which the property is
totally destroyed and those in which it has been injured but is
repairable, and we have concluded that when the owner of a
negligently destroyed commercial vehicle has suffered injury by
being deprived of the use of the vehicle during the period required
for replacement, he is entitled, upon proper pleading and proof,
to recover for loss of use in order to "compensate for all the
detriment proximately caused" by the wrongful destruction."
6. The procedural issues involved in the case are disregarded for present purposes.
7. To buttress this position, defendant cited Pfingsten v. Westenhaver, 39 Cal. 2d 12,
244 P.2d 395 (1952); Lane v. Spurgeon, 100 Cal. App. 2d 460, 223 P.2d 889 (1950); Shook v.
Beals, 96 Cal. App. 2d 963, 217 P.2d 56 (1950); Bedell v. Mashburn, 87 Cal. App. 2d 417, 197
P.2d 98 (1948); Tatone v. Chin Bing, 12 Cal. App. 2d 543, 55 P.2d 933 (1936).
8. CAL. Civ. CoDE § 3333 (West 1970). The California statute remains unchanged.
9. Valencia v. Shell Oil Co., 23 Cal. 2d 840, 147 P.2d 558 (1944); Johnson v. Central
Aviation Corp., 103 Cal. App. 2d 102, 229 P.2d 114 (1951); Tremeroli v. Austin Trailer Equip.
Co., 102 Cal. App. 2d 464, 227 P.2d 923 (1951).
10. 53 Cal. 2d at 50-51, 345 P.2d at 927.
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Accordingly, the trial court's judgment was reversed with instructions to try the issue raised by the plaintiff's claim for loss of use."

III.

ECONoMIc ANALYSIS

Reynolds has some interesting economic characteristics which
are relevant to the disposition of this and similar cases, but which
do not appear to have been examined in the course of the proceedings.
Taking the simplest point first, recall that the plaintiff argued,
inter alia, that it would be unfair for him to bear the decrease in
wealth resulting from loss of use. The defendant, however, could
have countered that the rental price which he paid already included
compensation for bearing such risk and, therefore, the plaintiff had
no cause of action on this issue." Prior to the decision in the instant
case, California law clearly did not allow recovery for loss of use
when property was totally destroyed as a result of negligence. Under
this rule, a bailor could take out additional insurance to protect
himself against the possibility of this loss or he could insure himself. 3 In either event, to survive in business a bailor would have had
to take the probability of such losses into account in estimating
rental costs. Thus, the existing rule of liability increased his cost of
doing business and would have resulted in a suitably higher rental
price." Under open market conditions, that is, in the absence of
collusion and of legal restrictions on entry and pricing, the interplay
of buyers and sellers typically would have led to a rental price which
would have included whatever compensation was necessary ex ante
11. In support of his conclusions, Chief Justice Gibson cited the following authority:

Guido v. Hudson Transit Lines, 178 F.2d 740, 742-43 (3rd Cir. 1949); Buchanan v. Leonard,
127 F. Supp. 120, 122 (D. Col. 1954); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Blanton, 304 Ky. 127, 200
S.W.2d 133, 138 (1947); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Schuester, 183 Ky. 504, 209 S.W. 542, 54345 (1919); Paguid v. Evening Journal Ass'n, 127 N.J.L. 144, 21 A.2d 667, 668 (1941); Park v.
Moorman Mfg. Co., 121 Utah 339, 241 P.2d 914, 920-21 (1952); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 927
(1939).
12. Although the argument might have been precluded by existing California law as
stated in Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Starley, 28 Cal. 2d 347, 170 P.2d 448 (1946), the award of
damages for loss of use when the rental price included compensation for bearing risk could
be argued to constitute double recovery and thus be considered inequitable. Cf. id. at 451
(Traynor, J. dissenting).
13. A bailor could also recontract with the bailee, compensating him for making his own
insurance arrangements. However, there is no evidence that this in fact occurred in the case
at hand.
14. The expected loss is determined by the probability of loss, the amount of the loss if
the event in fact occurs, and the probability that the court will enforce the rule. The greater
the probability that the court will enforce the rule, the greater is the expected loss, and the
higher is the increase in the rental price that will be necessary to compensate the bailor.
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to compensate a bailor for the risk of loss under the existing rules
of liability.'"
It is possible, but immaterial to the"merits of the case, that the
plaintiff might have neglected to take out any or enough insurance
or that his self-insurance turned out to be inadequate. In either
event, he simply made a mistake in business judgment, a mistake
for which it would have been difficult to hold the defendant accountable.
Turning to the more interesting question of consistency, the
supreme court might well have decided to reconsider the existing
rule of liability." The holding by Chief Justice Gibson quoted earlier

simply states that there are no logical or practical reasons for distinguishing between cases in which property is totally destroyed and
those in which it is repairable. 7 This statement, however, provides
no basis for deciding which rule should be changed. Although a
reasonable man might well be satisfied with the court's sense of
neatness and fair play, there are some economic considerations that
might have been helpful in determining whether or not the distinction was logical and practical.
Professor Coase has shown that, if transaction costs'" are zero,
the rule of liability does not affect the output mix (the allocation of
resources) except, perhaps, through changes in the distribution of
wealth." Thus, if bailors were liable for loss of use and if they could
15. The argument has to be addressed to the extent that any compensation at all occurred. In the absence of collusion and of legal restrictions on entry and contracting (e.g.,
price control) both competitive and monopolistic market structures normally imply full compensation. This must be so, since firms unable to cover costs simply leave the industry.
16. In this event, however, it seems unfortunate that the change should be applied ex
post to the case being considered rather than applied henceforth to all subsequent cases with
similar characteristics. The latter approach, of course, would discourage litigation and increase the life expectancy of existing rules-and that may be inefficient on net balance.
17. A vehicle may be considered totally destroyed if the cost of repairing it is greater than
the cost of replacing it less salvage, all values suitably discounted to the present. If a bailee
is liable for loss of use only when property is repairable, he has less incentive to take precautions to prevent total destruction.
18. Transaction costs include negotiation, contracting, enforcement, and information
costs.
19. This conclusion has become known as the "Coase Theorem." In the main example
used by Coase to prove his point, whether cattlemen are liable for crop damage caused by
straying cattle or whether farmers have to bear the cost will not affect either the size of the
herd or the output of crops. If the initial assignment of liability rests on the higher cost
producer of the remedy, both parties will gain if the higher cost producer will contract with
the lower cost producer and compensate him for taking the appropriate remedy. For example,
when the farmer is held liable, but it is more economic to reduce the size of the herd than to
reduce the acreage tilled, both parties will gain if the farmer contracts with the cattleman
and compensates him for reducing the size of the herd.
In the cattle example, the individual initially held liable will have to bear the cost of
the remedy, and his wealth will be correspondingly lower. Thus, the initial assignment of
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insure and take suitable precautions more cheaply than bailees,
they simply would do so. If bailors were liable but bailees could
handle such matters more cheaply, however, it would benefit both
parties to recontract and let bailees perform the necessary activities.'" Symmetrically, if the bailees were liable and could undertake
the necessary activities more cheaply, they would do so. If bailors
could take the precautions more cheaply, it would pay both parties
to recontract and let bailors perform the activities.' To restate the
point in more general terms, recontracting will take place until each
party performs each activity to the extent to which he enjoys a
comparative advantage. In all four situations just discussed, the full
rental price (the price including insurance) paid by a given bailee
would be the same,"2 since the same least cost producers would
perform the same services which would be paid for directly or indirectly, explicitly or implicitly, by the same bailees. Thus, both the
allocation of resources and the distribution of wealth would be unaffected in the absence of transaction costs.
The introduction of third parties, such as a passenger or an
innocent bystander, leaves part of the analysis unchanged. As before, each individual in the enlarged set of participants would unliability affects the relative wealth of the parties. Since an individual's wealth is a major
determinant of his demand for various goods and services, a change in his wealth implies a
change in his demand functions. However, many of the changes in demand for a particular
good or service registered by different individuals will be offsetting due to some individuals
buying more of a good and other individuals buying less. Thus, the net effect on the market
demand for various goods and services-and, therefore, on the output mix-typically will be
small and its incidence and direction indeterminate without detailed study. Accordingly, for
most purposes the allocation of resources can be assumed to be unchanged as a result of
changes in the distribution of wealth. Coase, supra, note 1, passim.
20. Suppose that the cost of producing rental services, excluding liability coverage
against loss of use, is $50 per flying hour, and that liability coverage can be provided at $4
per flying hour by least cost producers or at $10 per flying hour by all other producers. If
bailors are liable and are also the least cost producers, they will offer airplanes at the full
rental of $54. If bailors are liable but bailees are the least cost producers, it would cost the
bailors $60 to provide both services. Accordingly, it would benefit both parties to recontract
and let the bailees provide their own liability coverage. That is, the contract would provide
that the bailor would rent the plane for $50 and that the bailee would assume liability for
loss of use, purchasing insurance from other sources at a cost of $4 and paying a full rental
price of $54. Alternatively, the bailor could contract to rent the plane for $54 and then
contract separately to purchase the liability coverage from the bailee for $4, again yielding a
full rental price to bailee of $54.
21. The hypothetical presented in note 20 supra can be extended easily to this situation.
If bailees are liable and are also the least cost producers, they will simply rent the plane at
$50 and provide their own liability coverage at $4, paying a full rental price of $54. If the
bailees are liable but the bailors are the least cost producers, the bailees will contract to
purchase liability coverage from the bailors, thereby paying a full rental price of $54.
22. Different individuals with different incomes, different risk aversions, and different
accident proclivities would purchase insurance baskets differing in quality and amount.
Accordingly, different bailees might well pay different full rental prices.
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dertake each activity to the extent to which he held a comparative
advantage, and the rule of liability would affect neither the full
economic cost of the activity nor, wealth effects aside, the allocation
of resources. The incidence of the costs, however, would be affected,
thereby affecting the distribution of wealth. The rationale for this
statement is as follows. If either the bailor or the bailee were liable
for damages inflicted to or by third parties, the same analysis presented in the preceding paragraph applies: the actual rental price
paid by bailees would allow for the possibility that compensation
might have to be paid to or foregone from third parties. If third
parties were liable instead, however, they either would have to
forego or pay compensation as appropriate, and the full rental price
paid by the bailee would be the net of these costs. Accordingly, the
wealth of bailees, and of bailors to the extent that the increased
quantity of rental services demanded at the lower price yielded
higher profits, would be higher, and the wealth of third parties
would be lower, than if bailors or bailees were liable.
Disregarding third party effects, which are not at issue in the
instant case, if transaction costs are zero, the rule of liability would
not affect who would bear the cost of the activities or who would do
what, when, and how. Thus, the question of consistency would not
exist: the rule of liability makes no difference in such a situation.
Even if some redistribution of wealth occurred as a result of third
party effects, the allocation of resources remaining unchanged, the
question of consistency would be reduced to a question of equity.
This is an important question, no doubt, but one on which economics can shed little, if any, further light.
In the real world, of course, transaction costs are positive and
rising. The higher these costs are relative to the gains to be shared
from recontracting, the less recontracting takes place." Indeed, if
these costs are high enough, no recontracting at all will occur. In this
case, as Coase pointed out, positive transaction costs imply that the
rule of liability affects not only the distribution of wealth, but also
who does what and how, thereby affecting the allocation of resources.
If transaction costs are high enough to inhibit recontracting,
efficiency criteria suggest that the least cost producers should be
23. In the numerical example given in notes 20 & 21 supra, the gains from recontracting
when the individual liable is not the least cost producer are $6, the difference between the
$10 incurred if the individual who is liable provides his own coverage and the $4 incurred if
he purchases the service from the least cost producer. Accordingly, the parties will recontract
if the costs of doing so are less than $6; they will be indifferent if contracting costs are exactly
equal to $6, and they will not recontract if the costs exceed $6.
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though strict liability is not implied. This would place

the incentive to undertake various activities on those individuals
who could undertake them more cheaply, thereby releaging resources for other purposes. In a world of scarcity, this provides a
good argument for taking efficiency considerations into account in
deciding cases which affect the cost-reward structure faced by individual decision makers and thus affect their future behavior.25 Indeed, it has been suggested that much common law can be explained as a slow process toward efficient solutions in response to
changes in circumstances which affect the benefits and costs of
undertaking various activities."6
In the instant case, efficiency considerations suggest the desira-

bility of a rule of liability which minimizes the sum of accident and
accident prevention costs. These costs would include the cost of
replacing or repairing airplanes, installing and maintaining safety
equipment, training pilots, taking precautions in the operation of
the vehicle, engaging in transactions and litigation (broadly interpreted to encompass settlement), and loss of use. The choice of rule,
therefore, would depend upon some determination of the actual
transaction costs involved and of the comparative advantages and
incentives of bailors and bailees in undertaking various activities,
having due regard for the problem of moral hazard.2 If the transaction costs were low enough, the choice of rule would not matter.
These are empirical questions requiring detailed study of the insurance and rental market for airplanes, and will not be explored fur2
ther in this paper. 1
24. The example developed in notes 20, 21 & 23 supra can be used to cast light on this
point as well. If the individual who is liable is not the least cost producer and contracting
costs exceed the gains from recontracting ($6 in the example), he will provide the service
himself, incurring the higher costs ($10 in the example). If the least cost producer were held
liable instead, he would provide the exact same service at a lower cost of $4, and the difference
between the two costs, $6, would represent the value of resources that would be released and
thus would be available to produce other goods and services within the community.
25. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the proposition is that efficiency considerations matter, not that they must be controlling.
26. R. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAw 98-102 (1973).
27. If an individual can affect the probability and severity of an event by his behavior
(e.g., by taking fewer precautions) then the expected value of the consequences insured
against will be higher with insurance than without it. Where applicable, this problem of
"moral hazard" raises insurance costs and actually makes certain risks uninsurable.
28. A more careful consideration of the thing to be priced would be helpful. In the
principal case, the value of the airplane at the time of loss was found to be $30,000. But this
price reflected not only the physical characteristics of the plane (e.g., a 1964 Piper PA-23
Supercustom Apache in good condition) but also such things as the time and place of delivery.
Apparently, the $30,000 value embodied delivery in four to five months or longer at an
unspecified location. At a higher price, however, a plane could be produced more quickly, or
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General theoretical considerations, however, do suggest some of
the advantages and disadvantages of a rule initially placing liability
for loss of use on bailees. One obvious advantage is that the bailee
has a comparative advantage in taking certain precautions, particularly as they relate to the operation of the vehicle (e.g., turning back
if the weather suddently deteriorates, or not performing dangerous
stunts). If he is liable, he will have incentive to take the appropriate
precautions. If the bailor is liable' in principle he can compensate
the bailee to take these precautions. In practice, however, beyond
some point policing and enforcing costs are likely to be prohibitive,
and the bailor may find it cheaper to install more, but less economically efficient, safety features, 9 or to take out more insurance, or to
do both.
Another advantage of holding the bailee liable is that he is in
the better position to know how he is going to use the vehicle and
has better information about his skills and assets. Accordingly, he
is in a better position to choose the optimal amount of insurance he
would like to buy. The bailor, if liable, would have to incur costs to
acquire this information and to use it in discriminating among bailees, charging higher rental fees to the higher risk users. In general,
to reduce these costs, bailors would be induced to insure with respect to the characteristics of the average user, and therefore would
be taking out too much insurance in some cases and not enough in
others. Although a bailee presumably would have the opportunity
to take out additional insurance if he wished, transaction costs are
relatively insensitive to the amount of insurance purchased; accordingly, these costs would be relatively high for small amounts of
insurance, thereby discouraging at least some transactions. Moreover, if the higher risk bailee does not bear the full consequences
of his actions, for example by paying higher insurance rates if he is
careless, he would take a free ride at the expense of more careful
bailees and would thus have less incentive to take suitable precautions.
it could be purchased from present owners with a less pressing desire for it, or the prospective
buyer of a new plane could be compensated to yield his place in the queue, or a plane of
similar design could be substituted.
The earlier the delivery date of the plane, the higher will be the delivered price and the
smaller the loss of use. One possible objective of a rule of liability, therefore, would be to
minimize the sum of delivered price and loss of use. Indeed, such an approach could be used
to give precise meaning to the terms "reasonable price" and "reasonable delivery period."
29. Thus, for example, one way to increase the probability that a vehicle, or any piece

of equipment, is used with the appropriate precautions is to require the bailee to utilize the
services of an operator, such as a pilot, skipper or driver provided by the bailor. Contracts
with such provisions will be observed with greater frequency as the value of the equipment

increases.
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On the other side, the bailor has a comparative advantage in
taking certain precautions, such as good maintenance. If he were
liable, his insurance rates would depend in part upon his performance of these activities, and he would have the incentive to take
appropriate precautions. With zero information costs, of course,
bailees would know exactly the risks associated with renting from
each alternative bailor. Rental prices would be affected accordingly,
with lower rentals reflecting exactly the cost of the additional risks,
and bailors would have exactly the same incentive regardless of the
rule of liability. With positive information costs, however, this need
not be the case.
Finally, a bailor, ceteris paribus, presumably could purchase
insurance more cheaply than an individual could purchase the same
insurance since risks are spread over the fleet and there are fewer
transactions. Such a presumption, however, does not necessarily
provide a case for holding bailors liable. As long as the difference
between the price that would be paid by bailees and the price that
would be paid by bailors exceeded recontracting costs between these
two parties, if bailees were liable, bailors would simply purchase the
insurance and resell it to bailees.30
In the absence of the appropriate empirical information, the
preceding considerations do not yield an unequivocal conclusion.
Nevertheless, a careful balancing of the various pros and cons seems
to tilt slightly toward a rule for holding bailees liable. A tentative
case for holding bailees liable for loss of use, whether property is
fully or only partially damaged, can not be supported on the basis
of some vague appeal to consistency, but can be supported on the
ground that it provides bailees with the incentive, inter alia, to
avoid the total destruction of assets.
A rule of caveat emptor has much in its favor. The greater the
degree of competition among firms in the industry and the greater
the repeat nature of the transactions, the greater is the incentive of
producers to be responsive to consumer wants and to provide those
amounts of insurance, information, and product characteristics in
which they have a comparative advantage. Under these conditions,
individual consumers will purchase those products with the price
and quality characteristics, including risk, which they prefer, and
they will undertake those precautions in which they have a comparative advantage.3 '
30. Co-insurance schemes should be observed under either rule of liability.
31. Indeed, Professor Oi has shown rigorously that, under certain plausible conditions
which include relatively high recontracting costs, a rule of producer liability would lead to
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IV.

CONCLUSION

Reynolds raised the question of whether the owner of wrongfully
destroyed personal property could recover for loss of use during the
period reasonably required for replacement. The California Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative on the grounds that to preclude
recovery was unfair, because the owner of wrongfully destroyed
property would otherwise have to bear the loss, and because it was
inconsistent with other state rules which allowed recovery under
apparently similar circumstances. In reaching its decision, however,
the court neglected important economic considerations.
Since existing law precluded recovery for loss of use when property was totally destroyed, bailors would have taken the probability
distributions and the amounts of such losses into account in calculating the cost of doing business (experience is a hard taskmaster),
and, given that bailees had not recontracted with bailors to provide
their own insurance coverage, rental prices implicitly would have
included an insurance premium appropriate to the risk. Accordingly, bailors arguably were already compensated for loss of use and
should have no cause of action on the issue. Given the existing rule
of liability, the court's decision provided the bailor with double
recovery. On the question of fairness, the plaintiff's position at best
was weak.
Turning to the question of consistency, the observation that
other state rules permitted recovery under apparently similar circumstances provided no indication as to which set of rules should
be changed.2 In view of its decision, the court presumably believed
either that the rule of liability did not matter or that recovery for
loss of use was desirable whether property was totally destroyed or
repairable. Although the court justified its decision partly on

grounds of consistency, perhaps, as in the development of so much
common law, it merely took a common sense step toward a more
economically efficient arrangement.
Economic efficiency requires that each activity be undertaken
by the least cost producer, thereby releasing resources to society for
other purposes. If transaction costs are zero, it has been shown that
the least cost producer of any activity will be hired to perform it by
whomever is liable. Under these conditions, the rule of liability is
the increased production of riskier product grades (in response to increased consumer demand
for them) than would exist in the absence of such a rule. Oi, supra note 2, passim.
32. The court clearly could not use the instant case to change the rule of liability for loss
of use when property is repairable. If it believed it to be incorrect, however, it is not obvious
that extending it to totally destroyed property would have improved matters.
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irrelevant for efficiency purposes; the output mix will be independent of the rule applied except, perhaps, as a result of changes in
the distribution of wealth.3 3 If transaction costs are zero, therefore,
efficiency criteria do not dictate which rule should be changed. If
transaction costs are high enough to inhibit recontracting, however,
resources will be wasted unless the least cost producer is held initially liable. Under these conditions, the choice of which rule to
change is significant. In order to identify the rule of liability which
promotes efficiency, therefore, the court could usefully have examined the obstacles to recontracting raised by actual transaction costs
and the comparative advantage of bailor and bailees in the insurance and rental market for airplanes.
In the absence of such information, a weak but plausible case
can be made to suggest that the court's decision was justifiable on
efficiency grounds. First, transaction costs typically are positive,
and the nature of the rental business suggests that they may be
significant enough to inhibit recontracting. Accordingly, the rule of
liability would have an impact. 4 Second, bailees undoubtedly have
a comparative advantage in taking many precautions (e.g., not undertaking dangerous maneuvers), including those that would leave
property repairable rather than destroyed. If, as appears to be the
case, bailees in fact are the least cost producers, then efficiency
criteria suggest that they be held liable. Thus, the court may have
reached the right decision for the wrong reasons.
Had the court taken the appropriate economic considerations
into account, there would be greater assurance that it had reached
the correct decision on efficiency criteria. Perhaps more importantly, in the process it would also have acquired better information
for weighing the issues of equity and consistency.
33. To the extent that changes in the rule of liability affect the distribution of wealth,
the issue of equity becomes relevant. If equity and efficiency criteria point to the same rule,
obviously there is no conflict. If they do not, then the gains from more equitable solutions
have to be weighed against efficiency losses, a balancing act to which economics cannot

provide the answer.
34. See note 19 supra.

